**Sent:** Thursday, August 14, 2014 6:32 PM **To:** Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken <White.Ken@epa.gov> **Subject:** (b) (6), (b) Fact Finding Documents

John,

Attached please find the documents we have prepared and accumulated in our fact finding for your consideration for the meeting tomorrow (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F). Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

#### Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1201 Constitution Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460

Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: coomber.robert@epa.gov



# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

# WASHINGTON D.C., 20460 OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

# **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

John Reeder, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator

FROM:

Robert Coomber, Attorney Advisor, LER

DATE:

August 14, 2014

RE:

Memorandum of Interview

(b) (6)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
$(\omega)$ $(\omega)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)$ , $(\omega)$

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)


2	
	(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 4:50 PM

To: Reeder, John < Reeder.John@epa.gov>; White, Ken < White.Ken@epa.gov>

**Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B) (b) (7)

John,



Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 3:02 PM

**To:** White, Ken; Coomber, Robert **Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B) (b) (7)

# (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

From: White, Ken

**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2014 2:38 PM **To:** Reeder, John; Coomber, Robert **Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b)

John,

We will defer to you regarding the scope of the investigation; (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F),

### **Thanks**

Ken White Attorney-Advisor U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Labor & Employee Relations WJC North Room 1402 Washington DC 20460 Mail Code 3600A Phone # (202) 250-8851 Fax # (202) 564-8121

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2014 12:20 PM **To:** Coomber, Robert; White, Ken **Subject:** interview with (b) (7)(A), (b)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks

**Sent:** Monday, August 18, 2014 3:06 PM **To:** Reeder, John < Reeder. John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken < White. Ken@epa.gov> **Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b)

John,

#### (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Let me know if there is anything further you need.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 9:57 AM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b)

Absolutely. Hopefully I can get help get this wrapped up soon.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 1:39 AM

To: Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken


**Subject:** Re: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B) (b) (7)

Thank you for everything this week. I know that was a lot of work, and it helped immensely.

JReeder

On Aug 15, 2014, at 4:50 PM, "Coomber, Robert" < <a href="mailto:Coomber.Robert@epa.gov">Coomber.Robert@epa.gov</a>> wrote:

John,



Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2014 3:02 PM **To:** White, Ken; Coomber, Robert **Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)

# (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

From: White, Ken

**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2014 2:38 PM **To:** Reeder, John; Coomber, Robert **Subject:** RE: interview with (b) (7)(A). (b)

John,

We will defer to you regarding the scope of the investigation; (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)

#### Thanks

Ken White Attorney-Advisor U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Labor & Employee Relations WJC North Room 1402 Washington DC 20460 Mail Code 3600A Phone # (202) 250-8851 Fax # (202) 564-8121

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2014 12:20 PM

**To:** Coomber, Robert; White, Ken **Subject:** interview with (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)
$(\mathcal{O})$ $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$ , $(\mathcal{O})$

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)			

John,

Attached please find an MOI (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Please let me know how you would like me to proceed from here, and whether you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460

Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: coomber.robert@epa.gov

From: White, Ken

**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2014 3:34 PM **To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** Coomber, Robert **Subject:** Re: (b) (7)(A), (b) Written Statement Thanks John, (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5) in our opinion, Sent from my iPhone On Aug 21, 2014, at 12:37 PM, "Reeder, John" < <a href="mailto:Reeder.John@epa.gov">Reeder.John@epa.gov</a>> wrote: Ken, (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F) **From:** Sullivan, Patrick F. Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 12:28 PM To: Reeder, John; Fritz, Matthew Cc: Williams, Allan C.; Gaffney, Christopher; Kaminsky, Mark T.; Ulmer, Craig **Subject:** (b) (7)(A), (b) Written Statement John and Matt: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

I will keep you posted.

# Patrick F. Sullivan

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

EPA Office of Inspector General

Desk: (202) 566-0308 Cell: (571) 243-2195 FAX: (202) 566-0814

Email: <a href="mailto:sullivan.patrick@epa.gov">sullivan.patrick@epa.gov</a>



# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

# WASHINGTON D.C., 20460 OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

# **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

John Reeder, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator

FROM:

Robert Coomber, Attorney Advisor, LER

DATE:

August 21, 2014

RE:

Memorandum of Interview of (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b	) (5)

(b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(B) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E) (b) (5)
(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

**Sent:** Friday, August 22, 2014 4:42 PM **To:** Reeder, John < Reeder.John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken < White.Ken@epa.gov>

Subject: RE: Next steps

John,

# (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:14 AM

To: Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken

Subject: Re: Next steps

Ok thanks

JReeder

(b) (6) m

On Aug 21, 2014, at 5:44 PM, "Coomber, Robert" < <a href="mailto:Coomber.Robert@epa.gov">Coomber.Robert@epa.gov</a>> wrote:

John,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

# Thanks, Bob Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460 Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121 Email: <a href="mailto:coomber.robert@epa.gov">coomber.robert@epa.gov</a> From: White, Ken Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 3:34 PM To: Reeder, John **Cc:** Coomber, Robert **Subject:** Re: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7) Thanks John, (b) (5) in our opinion, Sent from my iPhone On Aug 21, 2014, at 12:37 PM, "Reeder, John" < <a href="mailto:Reeder.John@epa.gov">Reeder.John@epa.gov</a>> wrote: Ken, (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

### (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

**From:** Sullivan, Patrick F.

**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2014 12:28 PM

To: Reeder, John; Fritz, Matthew

Cc: Williams, Allan C.; Gaffney, Christopher; Kaminsky, Mark T.; Ulmer,

Craig

**Subject:** (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)

John and Matt:

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

I will keep you posted.

# Patrick F. Sullivan

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

EPA Office of Inspector General

Desk: (202) 566-0308 Cell: (571) 243-2195 FAX: (202) 566-0814

Email: <a href="mailto:sullivan.patrick@epa.gov">sullivan.patrick@epa.gov</a>

# (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F),

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

**Sent:** Thursday, August 28, 2014 3:42 PM **To:** Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken <White.Ken@epa.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Next steps

John,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2014 5:31 PM

**To:** Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: Next steps

Ok.

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

From: Coomber, Robert

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2014 3:22 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: Next steps

John,

## (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2014 11:40 AM

**To:** Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: Next steps

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks

JReeder 564 6082

From: Coomber, Robert

**Sent:** Friday, August 22, 2014 4:42 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: Next steps

John,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Friday, August 22, 2014 12:14 AM

**To:** Coomber, Robert **Cc:** White, Ken

Subject: Re: Next steps		
Ok thanks		
JReeder (b) (6) m		
On Aug 21, 2014, at 5:44 PM, "Coomber, Robert" < <u>Coomber.Robert@epa.gov</u> > wrote:		
John,  (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)		
Thanks,		
Bob		
From: Reeder, John Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 5:32 PM To: Coomber, Robert Cc: White, Ken Subject: Next steps  Robert,  I am VERY appreciative of your work on this.		
(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)		

# Thank you

**From:** Coomber, Robert

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 4:41 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)

John,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460

Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: <a href="mailto:coomber.robert@epa.gov">coomber.robert@epa.gov</a>

From: White, Ken

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 3:34 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** Coomber, Robert

**Subject:** Re: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)


Thanks John,

(b) (5)

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 21, 2014, at 12:37 PM, "Reeder, John" < <a href="mailto:Reeder\_John@epa.gov">Reeder\_John@epa.gov</a>> wrote:

Ken,



**From:** Sullivan, Patrick F.

**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2014 12:28 PM


To: Reeder, John; Fritz, Matthew

Cc: Williams, Allan C.; Gaffney, Christopher; Kaminsky, Mark T.; Ulmer,

Craig

**Subject:** (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)

John and Matt:



# Patrick F. Sullivan

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

EPA Office of Inspector General

Desk: (202) 566-0308 Cell: (571) 243-2195 FAX: (202) 566-0814

Email: <a href="mailto:sullivan.patrick@epa.gov">sullivan.patrick@epa.gov</a>

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

.

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)
$(\omega)$ $(r)(x)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)(\omega)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)(x)$ , $(\omega)$ $(r)(x)$

# Dixon, Diane

From:

Glazier, Kelly

Sent:

Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:51 PM

To:

Dixon, Diane

Subject:

FW: Threat Report

See below

From: Franklin, Tami

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:50 PM

To: Glazier, Kelly

Subject: RE: Threat Report

Thanks.

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

From: Glazier, Kelly

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:04 PM

To: Franklin, Tami

Subject: FW: Threat Report

Per my call,

(b) (5

From: Dixon, Diane

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:58 PM

**To:** Glazier, Kelly **Subject:** Threat Report

Kelly,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

R/Diane Dixon Chief, Security Operations Branch Security Management Division, EPA

Wk: 202-564-2154 Cell: 202-437-2662



# Violence in the Federal Workplace:

A Guide for Prevention and Response

April 2013 1<sup>st</sup> Edition



- Offering security escorts to and from parking areas;
- Ensuring the employee is aware of employee assistance programs;
- Offering the employee use of a buddy system;
- Offering the employee transfer to another job; and/or
- Relocating the job and employee to another facility.

# 4.3.2 Warning Signs of Violence

The first question many people ask when starting to develop a workplace violence prevention and response program is: How can we identify potentially violent individuals? It is understandable that people want to know, and that "early warning signs" and "profiles" of potentially violent employees are in much of the literature on the subject of workplace violence. It would save time and solve problems if supervisors could recognize ahead of time what behaviors and personality traits are predictive of future violent actions.

# 4.3.2.1 Indicators of Potentially Violent Behavior

No one can accurately predict violent behavior in non-mental health, non-institutionalized populations. However, indicators of increased risk of violent behavior are available. These indicators have been identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Profiling and Behavioral Assessment Unit in its analysis of past incidents of workplace violence. These are some of the indicators:

- Direct or veiled threats of harm;
- Intimidating, belligerent, harassing, bullying, or other inappropriate and aggressive behavior:
- Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees;
- Bringing a weapon to the workplace, brandishing a weapon in the workplace, making inappropriate references to guns, or fascination with weapons;
- Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides;
- Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal problems) to the point of contemplating suicide;
- Pending or recent layoffs;
- Drug/alcohol abuse; and
- Extreme changes in behavior.

Each of these behaviors is a clear sign that something is wrong. None of these signs should be ignored. By identifying the problem and dealing with it appropriately, supervisors may be able to prevent violence from happening.

One cannot tally the factors, arrive at a "score," and then render from that score a probability violence will occur. Because each violence risk factor is embedded in a unique context, a given factor may contribute to the risk formulation to varying degrees. The subject who exhibits only one of the factors listed may in fact pose an extreme risk of violence if that one factor is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Please see the main FBI web site at <a href="www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/investigations-and-operations-support">www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/investigations-and-operations-support</a>, and also see <a href="www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence">www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence</a>, accessed March 29, 2013.

something like "brandishing a weapon in the hospital workplace while staring intently at her doctor."

A thorough threat assessment will also consider any "good news" in relation to the subject. That means mitigating factors against the risk of violence must also be considered. For example, a disruptive employee with a strong desire and commitment to complete his/her Federal career and retire may present less actual risk of further violence than another employee who has no expectation of reaching retirement. A subject with strong family connections and no wish to disappoint others similarly may pose less of a risk. Sometimes strong religious conviction will mitigate violence. These and other possible mitigating factors should be evaluated as part of a complete threat assessment while maintaining the subject's privacy.

Agency planning groups should ensure the appropriate staff member (or an incident response team) is prepared to assist supervisors and other employees in dealing with an incident of workplace violence. Some behaviors require immediate police or security involvement, others constitute actionable misconduct and require disciplinary action, and others indicate an immediate need for an EAP referral.

On the other hand, it is seldom (if ever) advisable to rely on what are inappropriately referred to as "profiles" or "early warning signs" to predict violent behavior. Profiles often suggest people with certain characteristics, such as loners and men in their forties, are potentially violent. This kind of categorization will not help predict violence, and it can lead to unfair and destructive stereotyping. The same can be said of reliance on early warning signs that include descriptions of problem situations such as someone who is in therapy, had a death in the family, suffers from mental illness, or is facing a reduction in force.

Everyone experiences stress, loss, or illness at some point in life. All but a very few people weather these storms without resorting to violence. Supervisors should, of course, be trained to deal with the kinds of difficulties mentioned here, such as bereavement or mental illness. However, this training should focus on supporting the employee in the workplace, and not in the context of or on the potential for workplace violence.

When an analysis of indicators for increased risk of violence is paired with a review of risk mitigating factors, the threat assessment team should be alert to the situation in which the subject appears to have nothing to lose. For those individuals, the fear of disciplinary action or even dismissal or incarceration is no longer a deterrent.

There are some violence risk instruments, normally used by trained mental health professionals, available to agencies concerned with the possibility of workplace violence. The Historical Clinical Risk Management (HCR)-20<sup>10</sup>, is an evidence-based instrument. Originally designed as a research tool, it can be useful as an applied device for assuring that all of the evidence-based risk factors are considered by the threat assessment team.

The Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR)-21 (revised) is a proprietary instrument. It is believed the WAVR-21 is the only workplace violence assessment tool

Risk is a 21-item coded instrument for the structured assessment of workplace targeted violence risk.

Webster, C., and others, HCR-20: Assessing Risk for Violence, Version 2. Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada: Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University, 1997.
 http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Historical-Clinical-Risk-Management-20.html
 WAVR (Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk)-21: A New Instrument for Assessing Workplace Violence

currently marketed that is based upon current violence risk research and has been subjected to tests of statistical reliability. While the WAVR-21 is based upon the same body of research evidence as the HCR-20, it has the advantage of helping the threat assessment team to document review of not only risk factors but also risk mitigating factors. In addition, the WAVR-21 helps the threat assessment team track risk factors and risk mitigating factors that are dynamic in nature. The authors specify the WAVR-21 should only be used by qualified test users. Furthermore, neither the HCR-20 nor the WAVR-21 should be considered a psychological test.

# 4.3.3 Training

Training for all agency personnel is an important part of any workplace violence prevention and response program. The training may differ based upon the target audience and type of employee groups, but, at a minimum, agencies should provide initial and recurring training on the following topics to all current employees, newly hired employees, supervisors, and managers:

- An overview of the various aspects and types of workplace violence;
- Symptoms and behaviors often associated with those who commit the violent behavior;
- Security hazards found in the organization's workplace;
- The organization's workplace violence prevention policies and procedures;
- Reporting requirements and processes;
- Specialized training on creating a positive work environment and developing effective teams:
- Training to improve awareness of cultural differences (diversity);
- Tips for protecting oneself and fellow coworkers;
- Response plan, communication, and alarm procedures; and
- Supervisory training in conducting a peaceful separation from service.

One example of a training program is the VHA's Prevention and Management of Disruptive Behavior (PMDB) employee education program. PMDB utilizes a tiered approach to training that maps onto the results of a comprehensive workplace violence risk assessment and is generally well-received by the VHA's individual facilities. Such an approach allows the VHA's individual medical centers to tailor their training programs to address the unique needs of their own diverse workforce.

PMDB is organized into four levels of training:

- Level I: Violence Prevention Awareness Training (1.5 hours on-line, Web-based training). Appropriate as a curriculum element in new employee orientation training.
- Level II: Observational and Verbal De-Escalation Skills (4 hours face-to-face training). Appropriate for employees assessed to be at low risk for workplace violence and/or for employees whose job duties require excellence in customer service interactions.
- Level III: Personal Safety Skills (4 hours of face-to-face training). Appropriate for employees who would benefit from having knowledge of basic self-protection and physical attack evasion and escape techniques. The combination of Level II and Level III

www.publichealth.va.gov/employeehealth/threat\_management/index.asp and

www.prevention.va.gov/VHA Prevention Policies and Guidelines.asp, accessed March 29, 2013.

http://www.wavr21.com/brief.html

<sup>12</sup> For more information, please see the VA web site at

# Coomber, Robert

From:

Dixon, Diane

Sent:

Thursday, August 28, 2014 12:49 PM

To: Subject: Coomber, Robert FW: Red Flags

Attachments:

Red Flags.docx; PVIWP precursors.docx

## Per your request.

R/Diane Dixon Security Management Division Office of Administration, EPA

Wk: 202-564-2154 Cell: 202-437-2662 BB: 202-731-4852

From: Viney, Barbara

Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 11:32 AM

To: Dixon, Diane Subject: Red Flags

Diane, this is a compilation of red flag information.

There are varying perspectives and I think it important to consider all of them.

Barb.

Barbara Viney 202-564-7972 Conflict Management Specialist Violence Prevention Coordinator

Mail Code 3602A William Jefferson Clinton North 1402 S/T 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20460



- 1. **Unreasonable**: They constantly make slighting references to others. They are never happy with what is going on. They are consistently unreasonable.
- 2. **Controlling**: They consider themselves as being superior. They feel a need to constantly force their opinion on others. They have a compulsive need to control others.
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  Their presence makes others feel uneasy.
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According to John E. Douglas, former chief of the FBI's Investigative Support Unit, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, some of the potential employee behaviors that should place managers and coworkers on alert include:

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- Compulsive reading and collecting of gun magazines;
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- Having an obsession with one's job;
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- Testing the limits of acceptable behavior; and
- Making extreme changes in behavior or stated beliefs (Burgess, Burgess & Douglas, 1994).

Red flags for stress in the workplace include layoffs, reductions in force, and labor disputes. Managers must be trained so that they can properly discuss these realities with employees.

**Caution:** This list is merely to help develop awareness and recognition of potential risk behaviors. There is no definitive checklist of behavioral indicators for a potential perpetrator of workplace violence.

# **Identifying Red Flags**

Why are so many red flags ignored and missed?

A study done by the USA Today revealed that clear warning signs existed in over 80% of violent incidents. Are bystanders not reporting red flags? Are threat assessment teams not aware of the red flags or misjudging the threats? The study revealed in an average week, one employee is killed and 25 are seriously injured in violent assaults by current or former co-workers. And in 8 of 10 cases analyzed where someone was killed, killers revealed clear warning signs such as:

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Lessons learned show red flags like these often go unreported or they are ignored. In some cases victims or bystanders may fear retaliation or they might think they are just being overly suspicious. And sometimes victims or bystanders make reports, but the person receiving the report decides the report is not serious, forgets, or does not pass the information along to all appropriate personnel.

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In order to save lives and prevent incidents from occurring in the future, suspicious activities and other red flags must be reported to the appropriate personnel immediately and ongoing. By providing employees, victims, bystanders, responders and third-parties the ability to

confidentially report suspicious behaviors, they will feel more comfortable and more likely to move from bystander to hero.

Many times one single behavior might not constitute a genuine threat, but when all of the dots are connected, a serious problem may be revealed. For example, maybe one employee hears that John Doe has threatened to "make everyone pay". A different employee learns that John recently broke up with his girlfriend. A third employee sees John putting a suspicious bag in his locker. Each of these events separately may not be reason for concern, but when connected...the whole picture has to be reviewed and Threat Assessment Teams need specialized awareness to help identify and mitigate risk factors.

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Organizations must ensure they are "connecting the dots" – incident reporting, red flags, threat assessment teams, all appropriate individuals, situational awareness, policies, procedures and etc. Connecting the dots means getting the right information with the right people at the right time so better decisions can be made and better results can be achieved.

So how can organizations encourage their employees and third-parties to pay attention to red flags and report them to the appropriate personnel before it is too late?

Organizations should establish, communicate and implement intervention and prevention programs at the individual-level and provide ongoing situational awareness updates for all appropriate individuals on the warning signs of aggressive or violent behavior. Employees, third-parties, students, faculty, etc. need to understand how to recognize early indicators – behaviors and warning signs – that can lead to escalation (bullying, intimidation, threats, harassment, targeted violence, etc.). Organizations can improve awareness of red flags and encourage individuals to report suspicious behaviors, threats, etc. By proactively addressing red flags, organizations can prevent incidents from occurring – saving time, millions of dollars, reputations and people's lives.

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This is a critical statement for organizations to understand and address. How is your organization ensuring your employees, third-parties, etc. understand their responsibility to report suspicious incidents, threats, etc.? Have you made it easy for employees to submit an incident report? Can they do so anonymously? Once an employee submits an incident report, how does your organization ensure the appropriate personnel or threat assessment team members are notified? How does your organization know what actions were taken?

Don't Get Caught Unprepared

As soon as an organization thinks they are safe ("My employees would never do that") and stops preparing is when they will get caught. It is critical for organizations to understand that the risk of workplace violence is real and implement a proactive approach to ensure workplace safety and security.

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When the right information is shared with the right people at the right time, your organization's chances of preventing workplace violence, negative publicity, lawsuits and much worse, are much better.

- ANY COMBINATION OF THESE INDICATORS MAY BE CAUSE FOR REPORTING TO DESIGNATED AUTHORITIES FOR FURTHER ACTION:
  - 1) Past history of violent or threatening behavior
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  - 4) Evidence of chemical dependency
  - 5) An obsession with weapons/inappropriate statements of weapons
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  - 7) Routine violations of department policy or rules
  - 8) Sexual and other harassment of co-workers
  - 9) Destructive behavior
  - 10) Obsessed with retaliating against workplace for discipline
  - 11) Showing little involvement with co-workers; a "loner"
  - 12) Resistance or over-reaction to changes in agency policies
  - 13) Significant changes in behavior or beliefs
  - 14) Deteriorating physical appearance
  - 15) Statements of excessive interest in publicized violent acts
  - 16) Exhibiting behavior that may be described or perceived as

"paranoid"

- ·A history of drug or alcohol abuse.
- Past conflicts (especially if violence was involved) with coworkers.
- · Past convictions for violent crimes.

Other red flags can include a defensive, hostile attitude; a history of frequent job changes; and a tendency to blame others for problems.

Other problematic behavior also can include, but is not limited to:

- · Increasing belligerence
- · Ominous, specific threats
- Hypersensitivity to criticism
- · Recent acquisition/fascination with weapons
- Apparent obsession with a supervisor or coworker or employee grievance.
- Preoccupation with violent themes
- Interest in recently publicized violent events
- · Outbursts of anger
- · Extreme disorganization
- · Noticeable changes in behavior
- · Homicidal/suicidal comments or threats

Though a suicide threat may not be heard as threatening to others, it is nonetheless a serious danger sign. Some extreme violent acts are in fact suicidal—wounding or killing someone else in the expectation of being killed, a phenomenon known in law enforcement as "suicide by cop." In addition, many workplace shootings often end in suicide by the offender.

While no definitive studies currently exist regarding workplace environmental factors that can contribute to violence, it is generally understood that the following factors can contribute to negativity and stress in the workplace, which in turn may precipitate problematic behavior. Such factors include:

- Understaffing that leads to job overload or compulsory overtime.
- •Frustrations arising from poorly defined job tasks and responsibilities.
- · Downsizing or reorganization.
- · Labor disputes and poor labor-management relations.
- Poor management styles (for example, arbitrary or unexplained orders; over-monitoring; corrections or reprimands in front of other employees, inconsistent discipline).
- Inadequate security or a poorly trained, poorly motivated security force.
- ·A lack of employee counseling.
- •A high injury rate or frequent grievances may be clues to problem situations in a workplace.

How then can we predict what kinds of behaviors are indicative of a person who is prone to violence? First, when we look at the lists of warning signs, the more signs a person manifests, the higher the risk. Second, the more recent the observed signs, the higher the risk. According to research, the following are warning signs that should lead an employer or supervisor to take them seriously and probably intervene: [25]

- ■Personal changes of any kind
- EChemical dependency
- Severe depression
- **ERomantic** obsession that is ignored or rejected
- **Constant blaming of others**
- High level of frustration with work or personal issues
- Inability to accept criticism
- Feelings of injustice or unfairness
- #Social isolation or low self-esteem
- **EControlling** and demanding presence

**U.** H. Pastor [26] identified a similar list of warning signs. He asked managers to answer the following questions regarding their employees:

- # Have they made threats?
- Do they have a history of violence?
- **B**Do they have paramilitary interests?
- Bo they act paranoid?
- IDo they have a history of substance abuse?
- Po they believe there is no future or no apparent alternative to violence?

≝The California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal/OSHA) also suggested behavioral and attitudinal indicators of potential problem behaviors: [27]

- Being upset over recent events
- Exhibiting recent major changes in behavior, demeanor, or appearance
- Withdrawing from normal activities, family, friends, and/or co-workers
- Intimidating, verbally abusing, harassing, or mistreating others
- EChallenging or resisting authority for unclear or inappropriate reasons
- Blaming others for problems in life/work, being suspicious, holding grudges
- Sing/abusing alcohol and/or recreational drugs
- Giving unwelcome, obsessive romantic attention
- Stalking
- Making threatening references to other incidents of violence
- Making threats to harm oneself, others, or property
- Having weapons or being fascinated with weapons
- Having a known history of violence
- Communicating specific proposed acts of disruption or violence

In terms of organizational outcomes, some of the consequences of what C. Meyhew and D. Chappell [28] called "internal violence" include the following:

- Unfair treatment
- Blobs moving offshore
- ■ Rapid change

- ≝Stress
- **EChanges** in workload and pace of work
- **ECareer concerns**
- ≝Changes in work scheduling
- **■Role stresses**
- **Dob** content and control issues
- ≝Wage freezes
- **■** Cost cutting and budgetary constraints
- Matter an agement practices
- **EChanges** in environmental conditions

Employees who display behavioral indicators may not be violent or aggressive at all, but they do bear observation and/or counseling. [29] Often when people are troubled and seem to be "falling apart," others avoid them, talk about them, and demean them. A kind or sympathetic word or even sincere concern from a co-worker or supervisor might be the one thing that turns the situation around and actually *reduces* the risk of violence. [30]

E[17]L. Greenberg and J. Barling, "Predicting Employee Aggression

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 5:58 PMTo: Reeder, John <Reeder. John@epa.gov>Cc: White, Ken <White. Ken@epa.gov>Subject: Fact Finding Documents (1 of 2)

John,

Attached please find the results of the fact finding you asked me to conduct. I will follow up with Word versions of the documents I have in Word format. Please contact me with any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

### Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460

Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: coomber.robert@epa.gov

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)	

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)	

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(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)	

# Dixon, Diane

From:

Glazier, Kelly

Sent:

Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:51 PM

To:

Dixon, Diane

Subject:

FW: Threat Report

See below

From: Franklin, Tami

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:50 PM

To: Glazier, Kelly

Subject: RE: Threat Report

Thanks.

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

From: Glazier, Kelly

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 1:04 PM

To: Franklin, Tami

Subject: FW: Threat Report

Per my call,

(b) (5)

From: Dixon, Diane

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:58 PM

**To:** Glazier, Kelly **Subject:** Threat Report

Kelly,

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

R/Diane Dixon Chief, Security Operations Branch Security Management Division, EPA

Wk: 202-564-2154 Cell: 202-437-2662



# Violence in the Federal Workplace:

A Guide for Prevention and Response

April 2013 1<sup>st</sup> Edition



- Offering security escorts to and from parking areas;
- Ensuring the employee is aware of employee assistance programs;
- Offering the employee use of a buddy system;
- Offering the employee transfer to another job; and/or
- Relocating the job and employee to another facility.

# 4.3.2 Warning Signs of Violence

The first question many people ask when starting to develop a workplace violence prevention and response program is: How can we identify potentially violent individuals? It is understandable that people want to know, and that "early warning signs" and "profiles" of potentially violent employees are in much of the literature on the subject of workplace violence. It would save time and solve problems if supervisors could recognize ahead of time what behaviors and personality traits are predictive of future violent actions.

# 4.3.2.1 Indicators of Potentially Violent Behavior

No one can accurately predict violent behavior in non-mental health, non-institutionalized populations. However, indicators of increased risk of violent behavior are available. These indicators have been identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Profiling and Behavioral Assessment Unit in its analysis of past incidents of workplace violence. These are some of the indicators:

- Direct or veiled threats of harm;
- Intimidating, belligerent, harassing, bullying, or other inappropriate and aggressive behavior:
- Numerous conflicts with supervisors and other employees;
- Bringing a weapon to the workplace, brandishing a weapon in the workplace, making inappropriate references to guns, or fascination with weapons;
- Statements showing fascination with incidents of workplace violence, statements indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem, or statements indicating identification with perpetrators of workplace homicides;
- Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal problems) to the point of contemplating suicide;
- Pending or recent layoffs;
- Drug/alcohol abuse; and
- Extreme changes in behavior.

Each of these behaviors is a clear sign that something is wrong. None of these signs should be ignored. By identifying the problem and dealing with it appropriately, supervisors may be able to prevent violence from happening.

One cannot tally the factors, arrive at a "score," and then render from that score a probability violence will occur. Because each violence risk factor is embedded in a unique context, a given factor may contribute to the risk formulation to varying degrees. The subject who exhibits only one of the factors listed may in fact pose an extreme risk of violence if that one factor is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Please see the main FBI web site at <a href="www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/investigations-and-operations-support">www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/investigations-and-operations-support</a>, and also see <a href="www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence">www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence</a>, accessed March 29, 2013.

something like "brandishing a weapon in the hospital workplace while staring intently at her doctor."

A thorough threat assessment will also consider any "good news" in relation to the subject. That means mitigating factors against the risk of violence must also be considered. For example, a disruptive employee with a strong desire and commitment to complete his/her Federal career and retire may present less actual risk of further violence than another employee who has no expectation of reaching retirement. A subject with strong family connections and no wish to disappoint others similarly may pose less of a risk. Sometimes strong religious conviction will mitigate violence. These and other possible mitigating factors should be evaluated as part of a complete threat assessment while maintaining the subject's privacy.

Agency planning groups should ensure the appropriate staff member (or an incident response team) is prepared to assist supervisors and other employees in dealing with an incident of workplace violence. Some behaviors require immediate police or security involvement, others constitute actionable misconduct and require disciplinary action, and others indicate an immediate need for an EAP referral.

On the other hand, it is seldom (if ever) advisable to rely on what are inappropriately referred to as "profiles" or "early warning signs" to predict violent behavior. Profiles often suggest people with certain characteristics, such as loners and men in their forties, are potentially violent. This kind of categorization will not help predict violence, and it can lead to unfair and destructive stereotyping. The same can be said of reliance on early warning signs that include descriptions of problem situations such as someone who is in therapy, had a death in the family, suffers from mental illness, or is facing a reduction in force.

Everyone experiences stress, loss, or illness at some point in life. All but a very few people weather these storms without resorting to violence. Supervisors should, of course, be trained to deal with the kinds of difficulties mentioned here, such as bereavement or mental illness. However, this training should focus on supporting the employee in the workplace, and not in the context of or on the potential for workplace violence.

When an analysis of indicators for increased risk of violence is paired with a review of risk mitigating factors, the threat assessment team should be alert to the situation in which the subject appears to have nothing to lose. For those individuals, the fear of disciplinary action or even dismissal or incarceration is no longer a deterrent.

There are some violence risk instruments, normally used by trained mental health professionals, available to agencies concerned with the possibility of workplace violence. The Historical Clinical Risk Management (HCR)-20<sup>10</sup>, is an evidence-based instrument. Originally designed as a research tool, it can be useful as an applied device for assuring that all of the evidence-based risk factors are considered by the threat assessment team.

The Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR)-21 (revised) is a proprietary instrument. It is believed the WAVR-21 is the only workplace violence assessment tool

Webster, C., and others, HCR-20: Assessing Risk for Violence, Version 2. Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada: Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University, 1997.
 http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Historical-Clinical-Risk-Management-20.html
 WAVR (Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk)-21: A New Instrument for Assessing Workplace Violence Risk is a 21-item coded instrument for the structured assessment of workplace targeted violence risk.

currently marketed that is based upon current violence risk research and has been subjected to tests of statistical reliability. While the WAVR-21 is based upon the same body of research evidence as the HCR-20, it has the advantage of helping the threat assessment team to document review of not only risk factors but also risk mitigating factors. In addition, the WAVR-21 helps the threat assessment team track risk factors and risk mitigating factors that are dynamic in nature. The authors specify the WAVR-21 should only be used by qualified test users. Furthermore, neither the HCR-20 nor the WAVR-21 should be considered a psychological test.

# 4.3.3 Training

Training for all agency personnel is an important part of any workplace violence prevention and response program. The training may differ based upon the target audience and type of employee groups, but, at a minimum, agencies should provide initial and recurring training on the following topics to all current employees, newly hired employees, supervisors, and managers:

- An overview of the various aspects and types of workplace violence;
- Symptoms and behaviors often associated with those who commit the violent behavior;
- Security hazards found in the organization's workplace;
- The organization's workplace violence prevention policies and procedures;
- Reporting requirements and processes;
- Specialized training on creating a positive work environment and developing effective teams:
- Training to improve awareness of cultural differences (diversity);
- Tips for protecting oneself and fellow coworkers;
- Response plan, communication, and alarm procedures; and
- Supervisory training in conducting a peaceful separation from service.

One example of a training program is the VHA's Prevention and Management of Disruptive Behavior (PMDB) employee education program. PMDB utilizes a tiered approach to training that maps onto the results of a comprehensive workplace violence risk assessment and is generally well-received by the VHA's individual facilities. Such an approach allows the VHA's individual medical centers to tailor their training programs to address the unique needs of their own diverse workforce.

PMDB is organized into four levels of training:

- Level I: Violence Prevention Awareness Training (1.5 hours on-line, Web-based training). Appropriate as a curriculum element in new employee orientation training.
- Level II: Observational and Verbal De-Escalation Skills (4 hours face-to-face training). Appropriate for employees assessed to be at low risk for workplace violence and/or for employees whose job duties require excellence in customer service interactions.
- Level III: Personal Safety Skills (4 hours of face-to-face training). Appropriate for employees who would benefit from having knowledge of basic self-protection and physical attack evasion and escape techniques. The combination of Level II and Level III

www.publichealth.va.gov/employeehealth/threat\_management/index.asp and

www.prevention.va.gov/VHA Prevention Policies and Guidelines.asp, accessed March 29, 2013.

http://www.wavr21.com/brief.html

<sup>12</sup> For more information, please see the VA web site at

# Coomber, Robert

From:

Dixon, Diane

Sent:

Thursday, August 28, 2014 12:49 PM

To: Subject: Coomber, Robert FW: Red Flags

Attachments:

Red Flags.docx; PVIWP precursors.docx

## Per your request.

R/Diane Dixon Security Management Division Office of Administration, EPA

Wk: 202-564-2154 Cell: 202-437-2662 BB: 202-731-4852

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  - 8) Sexual and other harassment of co-workers
  - 9) Destructive behavior
  - 10) Obsessed with retaliating against workplace for discipline
  - 11) Showing little involvement with co-workers; a "loner"
  - 12) Resistance or over-reaction to changes in agency policies
  - 13) Significant changes in behavior or beliefs
  - 14) Deteriorating physical appearance
  - 15) Statements of excessive interest in publicized violent acts
  - 16) Exhibiting behavior that may be described or perceived as

"paranoid"

- ·A history of drug or alcohol abuse.
- Past conflicts (especially if violence was involved) with coworkers.
- · Past convictions for violent crimes.

Other red flags can include a defensive, hostile attitude; a history of frequent job changes; and a tendency to blame others for problems.

Other problematic behavior also can include, but is not limited to:

- · Increasing belligerence
- · Ominous, specific threats
- Hypersensitivity to criticism
- · Recent acquisition/fascination with weapons
- Apparent obsession with a supervisor or coworker or employee grievance.
- Preoccupation with violent themes
- Interest in recently publicized violent events
- · Outbursts of anger
- · Extreme disorganization
- · Noticeable changes in behavior
- · Homicidal/suicidal comments or threats

Though a suicide threat may not be heard as threatening to others, it is nonetheless a serious danger sign. Some extreme violent acts are in fact suicidal—wounding or killing someone else in the expectation of being killed, a phenomenon known in law enforcement as "suicide by cop." In addition, many workplace shootings often end in suicide by the offender.

While no definitive studies currently exist regarding workplace environmental factors that can contribute to violence, it is generally understood that the following factors can contribute to negativity and stress in the workplace, which in turn may precipitate problematic behavior. Such factors include:

- Understaffing that leads to job overload or compulsory overtime.
- •Frustrations arising from poorly defined job tasks and responsibilities.
- · Downsizing or reorganization.
- · Labor disputes and poor labor-management relations.
- Poor management styles (for example, arbitrary or unexplained orders; over-monitoring; corrections or reprimands in front of other employees, inconsistent discipline).
- Inadequate security or a poorly trained, poorly motivated security force.
- ·A lack of employee counseling.
- •A high injury rate or frequent grievances may be clues to problem situations in a workplace.

How then can we predict what kinds of behaviors are indicative of a person who is prone to violence? First, when we look at the lists of warning signs, the more signs a person manifests, the higher the risk. Second, the more recent the observed signs, the higher the risk. According to research, the following are warning signs that should lead an employer or supervisor to take them seriously and probably intervene: [25]

- ■Personal changes of any kind
- EChemical dependency
- Severe depression
- **ERomantic** obsession that is ignored or rejected
- **Constant blaming of others**
- High level of frustration with work or personal issues
- Inability to accept criticism
- Feelings of injustice or unfairness
- #Social isolation or low self-esteem
- **EControlling** and demanding presence

**U.** H. Pastor [26] identified a similar list of warning signs. He asked managers to answer the following questions regarding their employees:

- # Have they made threats?
- Do they have a history of violence?
- **B**Do they have paramilitary interests?
- Bo they act paranoid?
- IDo they have a history of substance abuse?
- Po they believe there is no future or no apparent alternative to violence?

≝The California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal/OSHA) also suggested behavioral and attitudinal indicators of potential problem behaviors: [27]

- Being upset over recent events
- Exhibiting recent major changes in behavior, demeanor, or appearance
- Withdrawing from normal activities, family, friends, and/or co-workers
- Intimidating, verbally abusing, harassing, or mistreating others
- EChallenging or resisting authority for unclear or inappropriate reasons
- Blaming others for problems in life/work, being suspicious, holding grudges
- Sing/abusing alcohol and/or recreational drugs
- Giving unwelcome, obsessive romantic attention
- Stalking
- Making threatening references to other incidents of violence
- Making threats to harm oneself, others, or property
- Having weapons or being fascinated with weapons
- Having a known history of violence
- Communicating specific proposed acts of disruption or violence

In terms of organizational outcomes, some of the consequences of what C. Meyhew and D. Chappell [28] called "internal violence" include the following:

- Unfair treatment
- Blobs moving offshore
- ■ Rapid change

- ≝Stress
- **EChanges** in workload and pace of work
- **ECareer concerns**
- ≝Changes in work scheduling
- **■Role stresses**
- **Dob** content and control issues
- ≝Wage freezes
- **■** Cost cutting and budgetary constraints
- Matter in a series in a serie
- **EChanges** in environmental conditions

Employees who display behavioral indicators may not be violent or aggressive at all, but they do bear observation and/or counseling. [29] Often when people are troubled and seem to be "falling apart," others avoid them, talk about them, and demean them. A kind or sympathetic word or even sincere concern from a co-worker or supervisor might be the one thing that turns the situation around and actually *reduces* the risk of violence. [30]

E[17]L. Greenberg and J. Barling, "Predicting Employee Aggression

(b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(B) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E) (b) (5)
(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)



# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

# WASHINGTON D.C., 20460 OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

## **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

John Reeder, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator

FROM:

Robert Coomber, Attorney Advisor, LER

DATE:

September 4, 2014

RE:

(b) (7)(A), (b) Fact-Finding

(b) (7)(A	A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F), (b) (5)
In addition, I have attached Word v	ersions of all documents available in Word format for ease of

review.

You are currently viewing the printable version of this article, to return to the normal page, please <u>click here</u>.

# Top EPA official accused of assault denies charges

Victim was auditing his work

By Jim McElhatton - The Washington Times - Wednesday, September 3, 2014

A top official in the EPA's Homeland Security office accused of assaulting a federal agent and stonewalling the agent's investigation says he's been unfairly smeared in a "campaign of harassment" by the press and lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

In a letter to congressional investigators, an attorney for Steve Williams, the Environmental Protection Agency adviser, denied he's contributed to a hostile work environment in the controversial office.

Lawyer Jonathan Biran released the letter Wednesday, but it was sent in May to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. It is the first public account by Mr. Williams of a confrontation between he and inspector general investigator Elisabeth Drake Heller, who said he acted belligerently toward her and stonewalled an investigation, the exact subject of which has not been disclosed.

She filed an assault complaint that prompted the Federal Protective Services to issue an arrest warrant, but the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to press charges.

In his letter, however, Mr. Williams' lawyer called the decision by prosecutors "fully appropriate." He also noted that his client never appeared threatening and that, at five foot three inches tall, he was much shorter than Ms. Heller and another IG agent.

Mr. Biran said the incident occurred amid a "bureaucratic turf battle" between the IG's office and the EPA's Homeland Security office that's been going on for years.

The oversight committee held a hearing earlier this year looking into EPA interference into probes of its work, and Mr. Williams was a focus of the hearing. He did not testify at the time.

In the letter, Mr. Biran says Mr. Williams and other Homeland Security office officials were punished for standing up to the IG's office, and said EPA leaders failed to protect them.

Referring to the assault complaint, "Mr. Williams told agents several times to leave OHS' space, and they eventually complied," Mr. Biran wrote. "At no time during this incident did Mr. Williams touch or threaten to harm [Ms.] Drake."

But in a separate letter to committee leaders earlier this week, an attorney for Ms. Drake complained that there's been "no meaningful action" taken by EPA officials since the incident, saying the agency continued to "coddle" Mr. Williams.

The attorney for Ms. Drake also referred to additional reports of "belligerent and obstructive" behavior by Mr. Williams.

The lawyer for Mr. Williams disagreed. He also railed against comments made during a congressional hearing earlier this year by Bob Perciasepe, EPA's former deputy, who said that other employees had made claims against Mr. Williams.

"Mr. Williams has not been called to defend himself against any such allegations," Mr. Biran said in the letter. "But since Mr. Perciasepe inappropriately mentioned these allegations Mr. Williams has not acted improperly toward any other OHS employees or anyone else within EPA."

The IG's office has expressed concerns that the Homeland Security office has gone far afield of its mission as a policy arm of the EPA, with one official telling lawmakers it had morphed into a "rogue" law enforcement agency.

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# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

## WASHINGTON D.C., 20460 OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

#### **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

John Reeder, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator

FROM:

Robert Coomber, Attorney Advisor, LER

DATE:

August 21, 2014

RE:

Memorandum of Interview of (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)

	6 -
(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	
	:

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)


(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
$(\mathcal{O})(\mathcal{O}),(\mathcal{O})(\mathcal{O}),(\mathcal{O})(\mathcal{O}),(\mathcal{O})(\mathcal{O})(\mathcal{O})$

(b	o) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
(b) (c), (b) (r)(x), (b) (r)(x), (b) (r)(r)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)



# EPA investigator pushes for action on assault

By Jim McElhatton - The Washington Times - Tuesday, September 2, 2014

A top official in the EPA's Homeland Security office accused of assaulting a federal agent and stonewalling the agent's investigation says he's been unfairly smeared in a "campaign of harassment" by the press and lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

In a letter to congressional investigators, an attorney for Steve Williams, the Environmental Protection Agency adviser, denied he's contributed to a hostile work environment in the controversial office.

Lawyer Jonathan Biran released the letter Wednesday, but it was sent in May to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. It is the first public account by Mr. Williams of a confrontation between he and inspector general investigator Elisabeth Drake Heller, who said he acted belligerently toward her and stonewalled an investigation, the exact subject of which has not been disclosed.

She filed an assault complaint that prompted the Federal Protective Services to issue an arrest warrant, but the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to press charges.

In his letter, however, Mr. Williams' lawyer called the decision by prosecutors "fully appropriate." He also noted that his client never appeared threatening and that, at five foot three inches tall, he was much shorter than Ms. Heller and another IG agent.

Mr. Biran said the incident occurred amid a "bureaucratic turf battle" between the IG's office and the EPA's Homeland Security office that's been going on for years.

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In the letter, Mr. Biran says Mr. Williams and other Homeland Security office officials were punished for standing up to the IG's office, and said EPA leaders failed to protect them.

Referring to the assault complaint, "Mr. Williams told agents several times to leave OHS' space, and they eventually complied," Mr. Biran wrote. "At no time during this incident did Mr. Williams touch or threaten to harm [Ms.] Drake."

But in a separate letter to committee leaders earlier this week, an attorney for Ms. Drake complained that there's been "no meaningful action" taken by EPA officials since the incident, saying the agency continued to "coddle" Mr. Williams.

The attorney for Ms. Drake also referred to additional reports of "belligerent and obstructive" behavior by Mr. Williams.

The lawyer for Mr. Williams disagreed. He also railed against comments made during a congressional hearing earlier this year by Bob Perciasepe, EPA's former deputy, who said that other employees had made claims against Mr. Williams.

"Mr. Williams has not been called to defend himself against any such allegations," Mr. Biran said in the letter. "But since Mr. Perciasepe inappropriately mentioned these allegations ... Mr. Williams has not acted improperly toward any other OHS employees or anyone else within EPA."

The IG's office has expressed concerns that the Homeland Security office has gone far afield of its mission as a policy arm of the EPA, with one official telling lawmakers it had morphed into a "rogue" law enforcement agency.


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# **Fact Finding Report**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

# Prepared by Catherine Allen, SRA International

Submitted: May 14, 2014











Attachment 1

#### Glazier, Kelly

Subject:

FW: Clearance Suspension Issue

Importance:

High

From: Williams, Steven

Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 6:22:50 PM

To: Ross, Jon

Cc: Tulis, Dana; Guerrero, David; Dunham, Nancy; Martin, JohnC; Williams, Steven; Fritz, Matthew; Jutro, Peter

Subject: Clearance Suspension Issue

Jon,

Another possible clearance suspension issue was brought to OHS attention.

(b) (5)

How EPA manages employee clearances is a critical issue for the insider threat implementation plan, and it is important that EPA always gets it right. Again, please understand I have serious concerns. R/SW

Steve Williams
EPA Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator/Insider Threat Senior Official
Senior Intelligence Advisor
Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(202).564-6954
(202).731-6078 BB
93-42116 (NSTS)
HSDM: stagger williams/ddfs.com.may

HSDN: steven.c.williams@dbs.sgov.gov AWICS: savilliams@cpa.csp.ic.gov

This email may contain For Official Use Only and information protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 as Amended.

Attachment 2

#### Ross, Jon

From:

Ross, Jon

Sent:

Wednesday, April 09, 2014 8:02 AM

To:

Ross, Jon

Subject:

(b) (6)

Cheers.
Jon Ross
Chief
Personnel Security Branch
Security Management Division
OARM
US EPA
Office: (202) 564-6153
Cell: (202) 641-1092

From: Franklin, Tami

Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 8:17 AM To: Glazier, Kelly; Page, Renee

Cc: Ross, Jon

Subject: RE: EPA Distribution List for NITTF Materials

ISOO specifically noted yesterday in the out-brief that it was a positive thing that we were actively engaged on what's going on with Insider Threat program development at the Federal level and attending the NITTF meetings.

From: Glazier, Kelly

Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 8:13 AM To: Page, Renee; Franklin, Tami

Cc: Ross, Jon

Subject: Fw: EPA Distribution List for NITTF Materials

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

	(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
From: Williams, Steven [mailto:Williams.St	no officer and
From: williams, Steven (manto: williams. St	CACHENGED OF 1

Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2013 8:10 PM

To: NITTF-Assistance; Karen S Rose; Anthony A Saputo
Cc: williams.steven; Reyes, Juan; Martin, JohnC; Dunham, Nancy
Subject: EPA Distribution List for NITTF Materials

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Ross, Jon

Ross, Jon Wednesday, April 09, 2014 8:01 AM Ross, Jon (b) (6)

From: Sent: To: Subject:

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

From: KARENSR@dni.gov [mailto:KARENSR@dni.gov]

Sent: Friday, June 21, 2013 9:50 AM

Subject: NITTF Expanded Staff Meeting - July

Good Morning,

The next NITTF Expanded Staff meeting will be held 1000-1230 on Wednesday, July 17th, in Chantilly. We are still formalizing an agenda but wanted you to ensure you save time on your schedule. The meeting will be held in the Montgomery Conference Room; a map to our facility is attached, which includes directions on how to access our office on the second floor. Last month, we reached our maximum number of attendees for our conference room a week prior to the event; please respond as soon as you know you will attend.

- Please RSVP if you plan to attend by contacting me at karensr@dni.gov or 571/204-6518
- Please let me know if have an IC badge
- If you do not have an IC badge, I will need your full name and SSN

Also, we wanted to remind you that May 21 was the date by which all agencies and departments were to report to the NITTF on their status regarding establishing an insider threat program under the National Insider Threat Policy and the Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs. An email response is adequate. Please see attached letter for details.

We look forward to seeing you on 17 July.

Thank you.

Karen

Karen S. Roso

Executive Administrative Assistant, SAIC National Insider Threat Task Force 571-204-6518 (U) 935-8931(S)

# Coomber, Robert

From:

White, Ken

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Thursday, August 14, 2014 5:20 PM Coomber, Robert FW: Issue of Concern re: preventing violence

Ken White Attorney-Advisor U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Labor & Employee Relations WJC North Room 1402 Washington DC 20460 Mail Code 3600A Phone # (202) 250-8851 Fax # (202) 564-8121

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

	•	•	
			(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
-			



# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

#### WASHINGTON D.C., 20460 OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

## **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

John Reeder, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator

FROM:

Robert Coomber, Attorney Advisor, LER

DATE:

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)

RE:

Memorandum of Interview o (b) (5), (b) (6), (c)

(a) (a), (b) (b), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(F)

	(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)
,	

2

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	

.

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

....

(b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (7)(b) (7)(c)
(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

From: Coomber, Robert

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2014 3:22 PM **To:** Reeder, John < Reeder. John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken < White. Ken@epa.gov>

Subject: RE: Next steps

John,

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2014 11:40 AM

To: Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken

Subject: RE: Next steps

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks

JReeder (b) (5), (b) (6) (b) (7)

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 4:42 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

Subject: RE: Next steps

### John,

#### (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:14 AM

To: Coomber, Robert

Cc: White, Ken

Subject: Re: Next steps

Ok thanks

#### JReeder

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) m

On Aug 21, 2014, at 5:44 PM, "Coomber, Robert" < <a href="mailto:Coomber.Robert@epa.gov">Coomber.Robert@epa.gov</a>> wrote:

#### John,

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks,

Bob


From: Reeder, John

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 5:32 PM

To: Coomber, Robert

**Cc:** White, Ken **Subject:** Next steps

Robert,



### Thank you

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 4:41 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** White, Ken

**Subject:** RE: (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

John,

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Please let me know how you would like me to proceed from here, and whether you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH

Mail Stop 3600M

Washington, D.C. 20460 Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: <a href="mailto:coomber.robert@epa.gov">coomber.robert@epa.gov</a>

From: White, Ken

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 3:34 PM

**To:** Reeder, John **Cc:** Coomber, Robert


**Subject:** Re: (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks John,

in our opinion, (b) (5)

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 21, 2014, at 12:37 PM, "Reeder, John" < <a href="mailto:Reeder.John@epa.gov">Reeder.John@epa.gov</a>> wrote:



**From:** Sullivan, Patrick F.

**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2014 12:28 PM

To: Reeder, John; Fritz, Matthew

Cc: Williams, Allan C.; Gaffney, Christopher; Kaminsky, Mark T.; Ulmer,

Craig



I will keep you posted.

# Patrick F. Sullivan

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

EPA Office of Inspector General

Desk: (202) 566-0308 Cell: (571) 243-2195 FAX: (202) 566-0814

Email: <a href="mailto:sullivan.patrick@epa.gov">sullivan.patrick@epa.gov</a>

(b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(C)
(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

-----Original Message-----From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 2:07 PM

To: Reeder, John < Reeder.John@epa.gov> Subject: Emailing:  $^{(b)}$  (5).  $^{(b)}$  (6).  $^{(b)}$  (7)(A).  $^{(b)}$  (7)(C).  $^{(b)}$  .pdf

John,



Note: To protect against computer viruses, e-mail programs may prevent sending or receiving certain types of file attachments. Check your e-mail security settings to determine how attachments are handled.

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Friday, September 05, 2014 1:27 PMTo: Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov>Cc: White, Ken <White.Ken@epa.gov>Subject: RE: Fact Finding Documents (2 of 2)

John,

I was able to find part or possibly all of the original article

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Coomber, Robert

**Sent:** Friday, September 05, 2014 10:21 AM

**To:** Reeder, John

Cc: Ken White (white.ken@epa.gov)

**Subject:** RE: Fact Finding Documents (2 of 2)

John,

The article that was attached

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Interestingly, the content of the September article currently posted on the Times' website is identical to another article posted the next day (September 3) entitled "Top EPA official accused of assault denies charges." Both of these articles with different titles but identical content were provided to you in earlier emails.

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

#### Bob

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 6:00 PM

To: Reeder, John

Cc: Ken White (white.ken@epa.gov)

**Subject:** RE: Fact Finding Documents (2 of 2)

John,

Attached please find some Word versions of the documents I sent previously.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 5:58 PM

To: Reeder, John

Cc: Ken White (white.ken@epa.gov)
Subject: Fact Finding Documents (1 of 2)

John,

Attached please find the results of the fact finding you asked me to conduct. I will follow up with Word versions of the documents I have in Word format. Please contact me with any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor

Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH

Mail Stop 3600M

Washington, D.C. 20460 Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: coomber.robert@epa.gov

# EPA investigator pushes for action on assault



Under Gina McCarthy, The EPA has been flexing its regulatory muscle, collecting more fines and hitting individuals with penalties for violating environmental rules. (Associated Press) more >

By Jim McElhatton - The Washington Times - Tuesday, September 2, 2014

A government investigator says that the <u>Environmental Protection Agency</u> continues to "coddle" a key figure in her stonewalled investigation into a controversial <u>EPA</u> office.

The EPA Office of Inspector General investigator, <u>Elisabeth Heller Drake</u>, first testified about a long-delayed probe into the agency's homeland security office at a congressional hearing four months ago.

<u>SEE ALSO: Fake CIA agent helped craft sweeping environmental rules while at EPA</u>

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## SEE ALSO: McCarthy denies trying to obstruct oversight at EPA

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<u>assault/?utm\_source=RSS\_Feed&utm\_medium=RSS#ixzz3CSgztbAF\_</u>

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
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
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# EPA investigator pushes for action on assault



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assault/?utm\_source=RSS\_Feed&utm\_medium=RSS#ixzz3CSgztbAF

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From: Coomber, Robert

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 09, 2014 5:19 PM **To:** Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Confidential

John,

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 4:42 PM

To: Viney, Barbara; White, Ken; Freeman, Angela; Jamison, Noel; Coomber, Robert; Williams, Allan

C.; Fritz, Matthew; Guerrero, David

**Cc:** Baldwin, Mark **Subject:** Confidential

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Thank you everyone.

John E. Reeder 564 6082

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
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SEE ALSO: Fake CIA agent helped craft sweeping environmental rules while at EPA

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# SEE ALSO: McCarthy denies trying to obstruct oversight at EPA

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assault/?utm\_source=RSS\_Feed&utm\_medium=RSS#ixzz3CSgztbAF

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From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 5:57 PM

**To:** Reeder, John < Reeder. John@epa.gov>; Viney, Barbara < Viney. Barbara@epa.gov>; White, Ken

<White.Ken@epa.gov>; Freeman, Angela <Freeman.Angela@epa.gov>; Jamison, Noel

<Jamison.Noel@epa.gov>; Williams, Allan C. <Williams.Allan@epa.gov>; Fritz, Matthew

<Fritz.Matthew@epa.gov>; Guerrero, David <guerrero.david@epa.gov>

Cc: Baldwin, Mark < Baldwin. Mark@epa.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Confidential

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Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 4:42 PM

To: Viney, Barbara; White, Ken; Freeman, Angela; Jamison, Noel; Coomber, Robert; Williams, Allan

C.; Fritz, Matthew; Guerrero, David

**Cc:** Baldwin, Mark **Subject:** Confidential

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John E. Reeder 564 6082


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ws/2014/sep/2/epa-investigator-pushes-for-action-on-

assault/?utm\_source=RSS\_Feed&utm\_medium=RSS#ixzz3CSgztbAF

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From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 4:54 PM

**To:** Reeder, John < Reeder. John@epa.gov> **Cc:** White, Ken < White. Ken@epa.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Confidential

John,

I copy-edited and provided some clarifications of dates of meetings

(b) (5)

Thanks,

Bob

Robert D. Coomber Attorney-Advisor Labor and Employee Relations (LER) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. WJC North Bldg/Room #1402 GH Mail Stop 3600M Washington, D.C. 20460

Office: (202) 564-8126 Cell: (202) 412-7102 Fax: (202) 564-8121

Email: coomber.robert@epa.gov

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 11:04 AM

To: Coomber, Robert; White, Ken; Fritz, Matthew; Viney, Barbara; DeLucia, Joanna

**Subject:** Confidential

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) Barbara, I'd like to talk about issue 4 later today, and options for follow up.

## JReeder

(b) (6)

# Begin forwarded message:

From: "Reeder, John" < Reeder.John@epa.gov>
Date: September 22, 2014 at 5:56:33 PM EDT
To: "Reeder, John" < Reeder.John@epa.gov>

**Subject: MEMORANDUM** 

## **MEMORANDUM**


FROM: John E. Reeder

**Deputy Chief of Staff** 


TO: Vaughn Noga

Vaughn Noga Office of Administration

SUBJ: Review of Reported Security Risk



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From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, October 08, 2014 1:55 PM

To: Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov>; Baldwin, Mark <Baldwin.Mark@epa.gov>; White, Ken

<White.Ken@epa.gov>

Subject: RE: Memorandum (Vizian)

John,

I had a few small edits. Please see attached.

Thanks,

Bob

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 08, 2014 11:08 AM **To:** Baldwin, Mark; Coomber, Robert; White, Ken

**Subject:** Memorandum (Vizian)

Hello,

I've talked to Kelly Glazier (SMD) and Tami Franklin, and they are comfortable with the conclusions of this report.

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Mark is now doing final editorial fixing and substantive fact checking.

However, Ken and Bob, I would appreciate another read from you. I don't need you to worry about line editing....but would appreciate another review for accuracy, tone, and anything else you think is important to raise.

I'm hoping to sign this today.

Thank you.

John E. Reeder 564 6082

## **DRAFT**

### **MEMORANDUM**

FROM: John E. Reeder

Deputy Chief of Staff


TO: Donna Vizian

Deputy Assistant Administrator (acting)

Office of Administration

SUBJ: Review of Reported Security Concerns





(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	

From: Reeder, John

Sent: Friday, October 17, 2014 5:55 PM

To: Vizian, Donna < Vizian. Donna@epa.gov>

**Cc:** Gelb, Nanci <Gelb.Nanci@epa.gov>; Parrish, Cayce <Parrish.Cayce@epa.gov>; White, Ken <White.Ken@epa.gov>; Coomber, Robert <Coomber.Robert@epa.gov>; Guerrero, David <guerrero.david@epa.gov>; DeLucia, Joanna <DeLucia.Joanna@epa.gov>; Viney, Barbara <Viney.Barbara@epa.gov>; Fritz, Matthew <Fritz.Matthew@epa.gov>

**Subject:** Review and decision (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

Hello Donna,

Please see the attached memo.

Several components in OARM provided assistance in the development of this report, including LER, SMD, Noel, Angela, Barbara Viney, and others. I very much appreciate their support. We will be continuing some work related to this review with LER and Barbara in the near future.

The most immediate message is "no action" is recommended related to security/threat allegations. (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

### This report should be forwarded ONLY on a "need to know" basis.

Let me know if you have any questions or need to discuss anything.

Thank you

John E. Reeder

Deputy Chief of Staff

202 564 6082




# UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460


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OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR


MEMORANDUM ODGO O			
FROM:	John E. Reeder  Deputy Chief of Staff		
то:	Donna J. Vizian Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator (acting) Office of Administration and Resources Management		
SUBJECT:	Review of Reported Security Concerns and Alleged Threats Involving an Employee in the Office of Homeland Security		
This r and behavior	This memorandum provides a record of decision related to a report of threatening statements and behaviors by an employee in EPA's Office of Homeland Security (OHS). (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)		
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)		



(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)	
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I am not taking or recommending any disciplinary actions for any of the allegations or complaints reviewed in this memorandum. I will remind all managers involved in this review to avoid any retaliatory actions against any employee. Employees who were witnesses or were otherwise involved in this review will be encouraged to report any perceived retaliatory actions directly to me.

From: Coomber, Robert

Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2014 12:20 PM

To: DeLucia, Joanna <DeLucia.Joanna@epa.gov>; Reeder, John <Reeder.John@epa.gov>; White, Ken

<White.Ken@epa.gov>
Subject: RE: Final Review

John,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(B), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)

#### Bob

From: DeLucia, Joanna

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 15, 2014 12:06 PM **To:** Reeder, John; White, Ken; Coomber, Robert

**Subject:** RE: Final Review

Hi John – I'd like to forward this to Dave Guerrero, if that's OK with you.

Joanna DeLucia EPA Office of General Counsel 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW MC-2377A, Room 7454E Washington, DC 20460

P: (202) 564-3042 F: (202) 564-5432

From: Reeder, John

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 15, 2014 11:42 AM **To:** DeLucia, Joanna; White, Ken; Coomber, Robert

**Subject:** Final Review

JoAnn, Ken, Robert,



John E. Reeder 564 6082